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I. INTRODUCTION

T

he doctrine of the eternal recurrence played a central
role in the philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche. While
the doctrine’s centrality is indisputable, its function has
been debated. It has been interpreted variously as a
traditional piece of metaphysics on the one hand, and as a psychological test of the will’s commitment to a given action on the
other. In this paper, I undertake an exposition of the role of the
eternal recurrence in relation to certain key features of
Nietzsche’s philosophy, such as the Overman and the will to
power. I will argue that the psychological test interpretation is to
be preferred above the metaphysical interpretation. While the
metaphysical interpretation fails to harmonize with key features
of Nietzsche’s philosophy, the psychological test interpretation
harmonizes far better with them. The metaphysical interpretation is to be rejected because i) it fails to act as the “heaviest burden” that Nietzsche so heavily emphasizes, ii) its ultimately deterministic undertones are inconsistent with Nietzsche’s insistence on the freedom of the will, and iii) its identification with a
natural law is incompatible with Nietzsche’s many rejections of
laws, both natural and moral. Finally, it shall be argued that we
must understand the psychological test interpretation as applying only to the Overman. The doctrine is inapplicable to any
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other audience, and many objections to Nietzsche’s thought can
be avoided by taking this point into account.
II. REVALUATION OF VALUES
In The Joyful Wisdom 341 we find the first mention in Nietzsche's
published works of the doctrine of the eternal recurrence: "If that
thought [of the eternal recurrence] acquired power over you as
you are, it would transform you, and perhaps crush you; the
question with regard to all and everything: 'Do you want this
once more, and also for innumerable times?' would lie as the
heaviest burden upon your activity.” But before we can appreciate the importance of this idea it is necessary to understand that
Nietzsche saw the eternal recurrence as a replacement for traditional morality. He felt the need to push down what was already
crumbling, to question the grounds of traditional morality, to
"shatter the old law-tables." 1 Throughout his works, Nietzsche
offers a very powerful critique of nineteenth-century European
morality, and it is only after we understand his critique and what
he perceived as the inevitable collapse of traditional morality
that we can understand how the doctrine of the eternal recurrence is intended to fill the resulting vacuum.
Nietzsche sought to overthrow traditional morality for several reasons. One primary reason concerned the question of
God’s existence. Certainly a large part of traditional, i.e., JudeoChristian, morality is tightly tied to theism. This connection can
best be seen in the Decalogue. Our views of morality are often
inseparably linked to a divine command. However, against this
view of morality Nietzsche makes the famous claim through the
mouth of a madman, 2 and later through the mouth of Zarathustra, that "God is dead." 3
To Nietzsche, the implications of this statement are terribly
unsettling, and he was far from finding in this a cause for rejoicing. He referred to the collapse of traditional morality as a
"lengthy, vast and uninterrupted process of crumbling, destruction, ruin and overthrow which is now imminent." 4 For
Nietzsche, to say that God is dead is not to say that a god who
once existed has died—as in Christianity—but to say that the
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very idea of God is no longer worthy of belief. The idea of God
has died. Christ now merits no more belief than a Zeus or an
Odin. All figures are equally myths, who have passed away.
But beyond this, in a broader sense it means that the whole idea
of an otherworldly realm, of a Kantian noumenon, of anything
beyond this earthly existence, has also become unworthy of belief. 5 Somewhat parenthetically, it can here be objected that the
moral ruin that Nietzsche feared is not a logical consequence of
the death of God unless one subscribes to the Divine Command
Theory of morality. According to this view, the existence of
moral truths is dependent upon the existence of God, a point that
is controversial and almost univocally rejected. Whether
Nietzsche himself accepted the Divine Command Theory may
not be completely clear, but at the very least his fears do seem to
be justified in light of the fact that the better part of humanity
does subscribe to the Divine Command Theory, and may very
likely believe nihilism to be the logical corollary of atheism.
Although Nietzsche accepted the nonexistence of God, he
was still uncomfortable with the many detrimental beliefs that
are tied to this moribund idea in the popular imagination.
Firstly, tied to this notion of God, mankind holds almost universally to belief in personal immortality, the belief in an afterlife.
Nietzsche vehemently attacked this belief because he considered
it an escape from this world into an otherworldly realm that does
not exist. Rather than living this life here and now in the fullest
overflow of joy and power, one negates this world in a spirit of
weakness and looks for a beyond. But since there is nothing beyond this life, the desire for an afterlife is essentially a desire for
nothingness. Thus, Nietzsche accuses his religious and philosophical contemporaries of being nihilists and “world calumniators.” The belief in immortality “destroys all rationality, all naturalness of instinct—all that is salutary, all that is life-furthering.” 6
Another dangerous belief that is popularly thought to emanate from the idea of God as lawgiver is the notion of a static reality, i.e. laws, both moral and physical. Moral laws are created
by society in order to preserve the weak. But the fixed nature of
these laws is at odds with the nature of reality, which Nietzsche
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tells us is essentially one of Heraclitean becoming. Things constantly change in a continuous flux, and to impose static rules
upon humanity and nature is to deny the fact that reality constantly changes. "They will not learn that man has become. . .
[that] everything has become: there are no eternal facts, just as
there are no absolute truths." 7 Nietzsche thus radically denies the
existence of a rational and moral world order.
Although Nietzsche recognizes the tenuous position in which
the death of God leaves humanity, it would be a mistake to think
that he believed the situation to be hopeless. Quite to the contrary, he tried to separate his own position as far as possible from
those perceived nihilists whom he was attacking, e.g., Schopenhauer. His position is ultimately very optimistic. With the death
of God, mankind is free of all moral constraints. The horizon is
finally open for him to set out upon his own sea, to create his
own values, to bring forth a new dawn. 8 And the new dawn will
usher in a new kind of man. In place of God and the weak Christian type of human, Nietzsche gives us the Overman. 9
The Overman, the individual possessing the strongest will to
power, creates his own values and does not allow them to be vulgarized by the consensus of the masses, whom Nietzsche contemptuously branded as the “herd.” But the sort of willpower
that the Overman wields is first and foremost power over himself. Nietzsche is very clear that the struggle and overcoming in
which the Overman engages is, above all, self-overcoming. This
point will be discussed more fully later.
Thus it can be seen that the collapse of traditional morality
gives a few exceptional people the opportunity to exercise their
creative potential in determining what is right for them as individuals. And here it should be noted that, for Nietzsche, the denial of objective value absolutely does not entail the denial of all
value. Value of all varieties, and not merely moral value, remains as that which the Overman must create as the personal
expression of his will to power.
So, in his process of substitution thus far, Nietzsche has given
us the Overman in place of God, and the earth in place of
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heaven. Finally, as we shall now see, he has given us the eternal
recurrence in place of immortality.
III. THE METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION
As already mentioned, the eternal recurrence can be interpreted
as either a metaphysical doctrine, or as a psychological test, with
cogent reasons for both views. Having discussed Nietzsche’s
revaluation of values, we shall now discuss the metaphysical interpretation. The metaphysical interpretation is the view that an
infinite number of cycles of identical repetition actually take
place in the universe. Among other passages, the metaphysical
interpretation seems to find support from certain statements in
The Will to Power:
In infinite time, every possible combination would at
some time or another be realized; more: it would be
realized an infinite number of times. And since between every combination and its next recurrence all
other possible combinations would have to take place,
a circular movement of absolutely identical series is
thus demonstrated.10
This passage seems to indicate that here Nietzsche is thinking of
the eternal recurrence as something that is part of the objective
structure of the universe, something like a law of nature.
With regard to human existence, the implication of this view
is that each of us has already lived this exact life an infinite number of times in the past, and will continue to live it an infinite
number of times in the future. As Nietzsche states in Thus Spoke
Zarathustra:
Now I die and decay . . . But the complex of causes in
which I am entangled will recur--it will create me
again!... I shall return eternally to this identical and selfsame life, in the greatest things and in the smallest, to
teach once more the eternal recurrence of all things. 11
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Firstly, in support of the metaphysical interpretation, it
should be mentioned that Nietzsche did consider undertaking a
more extensive study of the physical sciences to try to find support for this theory. However, Nietzsche himself may have taken
a somewhat equivocal position on this matter. Our goal is not to
find which interpretation is true, or even which Nietzsche believed to be true, but rather to find which interpretation better
harmonizes with the body of his philosophical writings. With
that said, we shall turn to a critique of the metaphysical interpretation.
While the above passages do seem to lend a certain measure
of plausibility to the metaphysical interpretation, several problems with this view quickly arise. Firstly, this interpretation conflicts with Nietzsche’s conception of the eternal recurrence as the
“greatest burden.” And it does this specifically with regard to
memory and suffering. Supposing that the metaphysical interpretation is the proper one, we are at an almost complete loss to
make sense of Nietzsche’s reasons for describing the eternal recurrence in these terms. Presumably, Nietzsche is telling us that
the idea of a lifetime’s worth of pain and anguish eternally returning could crush us with despair. With this anguish in mind,
we are supposed to exercise our will carefully in making choices
that would not lead us into eternal regret.
But this attempt to make sense of the eternal recurrence as
the greatest burden rests upon a deep misconception. According
to Nietzsche, the life to which we return is not a similar life. It is
exactly the same, down to the smallest details. But then it would
follow that in order for the events of one's present life to be identical to the events of one's previous life, there can be no memory
of the previous life. Because one does not have any memory of
one's past recurrences, neither will one have any memory in a
future recurrence. This is to say that there is no "continuity of
consciousness" between the cycles of existence. 12 Hence, there
cannot be any accumulation of suffering throughout eternity because one cannot remember what one has already suffered in the
previous cycles. Nietzsche thinks that we can be guided by the
consideration of whether or not we can will something eternally.
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However, in identical repetition, it takes no more courage to will
something once than it does to will it infinitely. 13
In this respect, the question of whether or not we could will
to repeat something eternally would be a point of complete indifference to us. After we have suffered all that we will suffer in
this life, that amount, although terrible, cannot increase by any
memory of past suffering or dread of future suffering. All pain
in our future recurrence is beyond the range of our present consciousness, thereby making us unable to experience it as we experience fear of pain later in this life. It is "only by inappropriately construing the suffering of some future recurrence on the
model of suffering later in this life [that] the question of the eternal recurrence of one's pain weigh[s] upon one with 'the greatest
stress.' " 14
Thus, the metaphysical interpretation of the eternal recurrence would seem to be problematic as a guide for one’s will,
since there can be no accumulation of pain to help one avoid unwanted choices. Presumably, it is pain or regret of some form
that lies upon us as "the greatest burden," that gives us good reasons to consider our actions very carefully. However, if pain
cannot increase beyond this life, then we cannot suffer anything
worse than what we would suffer without identical repetition.
The metaphysical doctrine seems to make Nietzsche's "greatest
burden" less burdensome.
A second problem with the metaphysical interpretation concerns what appear to be the deterministic undertones of the doctrine. It is a point of contention as to whether such a view poses
a serious difficulty for free will. As stated in the passage from
The Will to Power quoted above, Nietzsche says that between
every combination and its next recurrence all other possible combinations must take place. A literal understanding of the eternal
recurrence places the strongest kind of necessity upon all of the
material world, human existence included.
On this view, our choices acquire less weight, since we are
not really free to make them. We are caught within a nexus of
possible combinations that demand actualization. Any choice
that one makes, since that choice would be the result of a possi-
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ble combination, would have to take place. If our choices are determined by a previous state of the world, and if these choices
must conform exactly to the choices of an infinite number of previous cycles, then we are not free to make those choices. The
question of whether we could will something eternally would be
completely irrelevant for us, since we would be eternally committed to it anyway. Further, asking ourselves the question at all
seems to be an attempt to surreptitiously slip in the thought that
we are in a first cycle, that we are in possession of a tabula rasa
with regard to our actions. But in infinite time there can be no
first cycle, and hence no first choice. There is always already an
infinite number of cycles behind us.
Perhaps the most ironic thing about this rather unpalatable
conclusion is that such determinism seems to be at odds with
Nietzsche’s numerous attempts to help us place the deepest significance upon our choices, and with his many passages discussing the freedom of the will. And it is because of these "fatalistic
overtones" that Schacht considers a metaphysical interpretation
to be “one of Nietzsche's thought-experiments which fails.” 15
A final problem with the metaphysical interpretation is that it
may also be objected that interpreting the eternal recurrence as
an objective statement of how nature operates would place a
glaring inconsistency in Nietzsche’s philosophy. He scrupulously avoids attempting to give insight into the nature of the
world as it actually is—the thing-in-itself—and he despised philosophers and scientists who attempted this. In The Joyful Wisdom, he tells us that we ought to "beware of saying there are laws
in nature.”16 Where scientists think that they are truly explaining
things, in reality they are only describing things better than those
in previous ages have done. 17
So, to think that Nietzsche intended the eternal recurrence to
function as a law of nature is to place him at the receiving end of
his own fierce criticisms. Just like every other attempt at formulating natural law that he objects to, such a scientific position
would attempt to fix the nature of reality, which Nietzsche has
already told us is one of change and flux. This is certainly not
the most charitable interpretation of Nietzsche’s work. In con-
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clusion, the metaphysical interpretation simply does not work. It
fails to harmonize with the key features of Nietzsche’s thought.
However, this failure of the metaphysical doctrine does not detract from the doctrine's usefulness as a psychological test. 18 Of
course, it is clearly not the case that the failure of the metaphysical interpretation entails the success of the psychological test interpretation. The latter must be judged on its own merit.
IV. THE PSYCHOLOGICAL TEST INTERPRETATION
To view the eternal recurrence as a kind of decision-making procedure for the will presents itself as the more plausible interpretation. In the collapse of moral absolutes, the will — which is
“beyond good and evil”— has filled the void. Nevertheless, the
unbounded will needs some guide to outline what is (for the individual, at least) the preferred course of action. As quoted
above, Nietzsche says that we should create our values by asking
ourselves whether or not we can will them eternally. 19 Although
we will not eternally recur, we ought to choose as though we will
recur, as though we would have to repeat our actions forever. In
the words of Kaufmann, we must understand the eternal recurrence “not as a dogma but as a hypothesis.” 20 Thus, rather than a
scientific theory, the eternal recurrence is meant to act as a practical guide to our actions. If, upon reflection, we decide that we
cannot will a particular action forever, then we should probably
refrain from it.
When considering the eternal recurrence, it is very important
not to confuse it with a moral principle intended to help one
to make ethical decisions, since ultimately there are no such
things as ethical decisions: “There are no moral phenomena at
all, but only a moral interpretation of phenomena.” 21 It is certainly not Nietzsche's intention to give any supreme principle of
morality. Supreme principles of morality —specifically the categorical imperative, for Nietzsche — are all equally guilty of
glossing over the highly individual nature of each particular action. “By means of them [supreme moral principles], indeed, a
semblance of equality can be attained, but only a semblance,—that
in outlook and retrospect every action is, and remains, an im-
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penetrable affair.” 22
While there have been attempts to compare the eternal recurrence to the categorical imperative, these are ultimately very misguided. A person who chooses his or her course of action based
on whether they could will it for eternity has in mind certain
psychological considerations and consequences. However, this
is far from Kant’s position, which stresses the logical consistency
of maxims and places no consideration upon consequences, psychological or otherwise. 23 The contrast between Nietzsche and
Kant is thereby one of consequentialism versus deontology.
Against Kant, Nietzsche calls on us to be the active creators of
our own values, to find what judgments are the expressions of
our will to power, rather than to follow a supreme principle that
is often someone else’s expression of their will to power. “A virtue has to be our invention, our most personal defense and necessity: in any other sense it is merely a danger. ‘Virtue,’ as Kant
desired it, is harmful.” 24
The eternal recurrence is potentially very powerful as a guide
because it forces one to refrain from committing to a given action
unless one can support that action with the entire will. Nietzsche
would not have us making careless decisions, but rather placing
the highest consideration upon each choice. Since this life is the
only opportunity that we have, we must act with the fullest
measure of strength and freedom here and now. Nietzsche conceived of the eternal recurrence as the greatest illustration of lifeaffirmation that we can possibly display. It is tightly knit to his
idea of amor fati, love of one’s fate. To be able to eternally will
the repetition of our life means “that one wants nothing to be different, not forward, not backward, not in all eternity.” 25 It means
a justification of the world and of our lives with all of our pleasure and pain. Ultimately, it is the ability to love even the suffering of our life that gives life its justification and purpose.
Further, the eternal recurrence does not demand any kind of
consistency in what we will, and so what we will in one moment
may not be what we will in the next. Changing our mind is perfectly consistent with the idea of creation and becoming. However, this is not to say that choice is arbitrary. As Nietzsche tells
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us, the “good” decisions are those that are the expression of
power, and the “bad” those that are the expression of weakness.
“What is good?—All that heightens the feeling of power, the will
to power, power itself in man. What is bad?—All that proceeds
from weakness.” 26 Thus, while particular expressions of the will
to power will undoubtedly vary, the “good” choices are those
that proceed from power.
But the generality of our discussion thus far may create some
confusion. One potential point of misunderstanding about the
eternal recurrence may arise from a failure to realize Nietzsche's
audience. To Nietzsche’s credit, he was fully aware that the eternal recurrence was not for everyone, and very serious problems
arise if one ignores this fact and thinks that he intended it for society. Nothing could be further from the truth, and Nietzsche’s
works contain numerous attempts to clarify this point. In Ecce
Homo Nietzsche explicitly says, "I never speak to masses." 27 Elsewhere, he explains how he has both chosen who his reader is,
and who he is not. A writer not only wants to be understood,
but he also wants to be misunderstood by those to whom he is
not writing. 28 Examples could be multiplied, but the fact that
Nietzsche deliberately made many of his works unclear to the
average reader seems a sufficient indication that he was not writing for everyone, but rather to the strong individual. The very
esoteric character of his works forces one to learn to read him
very carefully, a mental exertion for which most readers will not
have the patience. 29
His doctrine presupposes an exceptional individual, one who
can create his own values and will them eternally without external help. It is totally inadequate for any other type of person,
and is not strong enough for the masses; or perhaps it would be
truer to say that the masses are too weak for it. And this is the
primary point: The eternal recurrence is fundamentally and inextricably tied to Nietzsche’s conception of the Overman. It loses
its effectiveness with any other person.
Nietzsche fully recognized that the radical stance of his philosophy, e.g., the denial of objective value, would usher in turmoil. His attempt to correct millennia of lies—his revaluation—
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would inevitably lead to unprecedented conflict. 30 But lest it be
thought that Nietzsche was insensitive to the upheavals that his
philosophy was likely to cause, it should be noted that he acknowledged that the task of liberation from convention was a
very delicate one. As he says in The Wanderer and His Shadow,
“only the ennobled man may be given freedom of spirit.... In any
other mouth his motto would be dangerous.” 31
The weak individual should absolutely not liberate himself
from traditional morality, and Nietzsche had no intention of trying to liberate him. Instead, this person should stay bound. The
masses need strong external coercion, e.g., the state, Christianity,
etc., to keep them under control. As Nietzsche succinctly tells us
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "he who cannot obey himself will be
commanded.” 32 Freedom should only be given to those who are
strong enough for it. To remove all restraints from the masses
would be to loose true anarchy upon the world, a form of behavior which Nietzsche detested as much as he did Christianity. 33
When his philosophy is used to advance anarchy or antiSemitism, we should keep in mind that this was the opposite of
his intentions. Nietzsche’s comments on such positions are decidedly negative, and only a willful misreading such as that of
the Nazis can invite misunderstanding. Those who defend such
positions with Nietzsche's philosophy are ignoring Nietzsche’s
clear condemnations of such views and trying to enjoy the freedom of the destroyer without paying the high price of the creator.
And the creator does pay a high price. Although it may seem
as though the creator is wildly free and uninhibited after having
cast off all moral restraint, Nietzsche tells us that the very reverse
is the case. Behind every action must be the consideration of
whether that action can be willed forever. Such a person has to
choose here and now, and cannot look for escape in a beyond.
Only such an individual truly lives with the full consciousness of
her own complete freedom. As the creator of her own laws, she
must also be her own judge and punish herself when she violates
those laws. And "it is terrible to be alone with the judge and
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avenger of one's own law." 34
But here an obvious question may be asked. What happens if
the Overman’s values conflict with the values of society in such a
way that hostility becomes inevitable? This is certainly to be expected at some point. Judging by the emphasis that Nietzsche
places upon the ideas of upheaval, chaos, and war, is seems impossible that the Overman can peacefully coexist with society. In
his better interests, the Overman may decide to live in solitude,
something for which Nietzsche frequently affirms the need, e.g.
Zarathustra’s residence on a mountaintop as a recluse. However, solitude is for the sake of the Overman rather than for the
safety of society, since interaction with the latter may prevent the
Overman from fully creating his own values, from achieving the
highest exercise of his will to power. Nietzsche tells us that although powerful, the type of human that he is seeking is also
very delicate, and has often been destroyed by society. Throughout the ages, he has been a "fortunate accident... never as something willed." 35 Certainly never willed, because his powerful instinctual nature makes him a terrifying creature for society. But
the well-being of the masses and the Overman’s ability to peacefully coexist with them was not part of Nietzsche’s concern.
But we must expand upon this point. If the Overman hurts
his neighbor while creating his values, then this cannot be
avoided. But, intentionally hurting others is not part of the
Overman’s character. Rather, any harm done to society during
the creation of values is only incidental and is not part of the
Overman’s deliberate intentions. So, contra many misunderstandings of his thought, “tyranny over others is not part of
Nietzsche’s vision, though the failure to indulge in it is no virtue
unless one has the power to become a tyrant and refrains deliberately.” 36 Refusal to enter into tyranny over others is a further expression of the Overman’s will to power. And the power that the
Overman wields is first and foremost to be understood as power
over himself, rather than power over others. In this respect,
Nietzsche’s conception of the Overman is very similar to Aristotle’s view of the noble and virtuous person, and much understanding of Nietzsche can be gained by a comparison to Aris-
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totle. Neither philosopher is concerned with morality proper,
but rather with a person’s ability to be noble, disciplined, and
self-controlled. Numerous passages in Nietzsche show the powerful influence of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and in this respect, Nietzsche’s conception of the ideal man is very similar to
the classical Greek view of the virtuous man.
To return to our discussion of the Overman’s relation to society, Nietzsche never promises that the Overman would help to
bring about an orderly society. Indeed, those looking for a system with which to build an orderly society should look elsewhere, because order was never Nietzsche's intention. To attempt to construct an orderly society from Nietzsche’s philosophy, we would have to completely overlook passages where he
speaks of his Dionysian nature, the nature that "encompasses joy
in destruction." 37 And again he tells us that “the last thing I
should promise would be to ‘improve’ mankind. No new idols
are erected by me.” 38 As Kaufmann has so aptly put it, “For
Nietzsche, the Overman does not have instrumental value for the
maintenance of society: he is valuable in himself because he embodies the state of being that has the only ultimate value there is;
and society is censured insofar as it insists on conformity and
impedes his development.” 39
V. SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude our discussion of the psychological test interpretation of the eternal recurrence, we must recognize that it harmonizes with the body of Nietzsche’s thought far better than the
metaphysical interpretation does. The former ties in with the key
motifs of Nietzsche’s philosophy such as the Overman, the will
to power, and his method of speaking to the individual far more
effectively than the metaphysical doctrine can. This ability of the
eternal recurrence so interpreted to make Nietzsche’s thought
coherent seems a persuasive reason to accept it as the more viable interpretation.
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God, see Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 335.
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7 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 2.
8 Nietzsche, The Joyful Wisdom, 343.
9 I have chosen to follow Kaufmann in translating the German
Übermensch as Overman, rather than its oft-used alternative translation Superman, since the former seems to be more in keeping
with the German meaning, and with Nietzsche’s specific references to self-overcoming. See Kaufmann, Nietzsche: Philosopher,
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